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Abstract 
With increasing stakeholder pressure to improve sustainability performance, firms focus 
on understanding how buyer-supplier relationship characteristics play a role in encouraging or 
jeopardizing supplier sustainability efforts. In this study, we examine how buyer-supplier 
dependence and relational capital affect the environmental and social performance of suppliers. 
We adopt an embedded, multiple-case study design, and examine five large buying firms in 
Turkey and their multiple suppliers at the dyadic level. Our findings suggest that there is a 
complex interplay between dependence and relational capital, illustrating both complementary 
and conflicting roles on supplier sustainability performance. We develop propositions to be 
tested in future studies. 
Key words: Dependence, relational capital, supplier sustainability performance 
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1. Introduction 
Business sustainability, the ability to conduct business with a long-term goal 
of maintaining the well-being of the economy, environment and society (Hassini et 
al., 2012, p.70), has been attracting growing attention from various stakeholders. 
This is due to the fact that firms are increasingly held responsible not only for their 
own actions, but also for the upstream and downstream supply chain members’ 
actions to the triple bottom line (Akhavan and Bekmann, 2017; Golicic and Smith, 
2013; Gimenez and Tachizawa, 2012). Examples from the literature and practice 
illustrate both the negative and positive impact suppliers can have on firm 
sustainability performance. For instance, the Danish toy manufacturer Mattel’s 
marketing performance had highly deteriorated due to a second-tier supplier 
accused of destroying rainforests in Indonesia. On the other hand, results from a 
detailed meta-analysis suggest that collaborating with suppliers on sustainability 
practices has a large, positive impact on firm profitability (Golicic and Smith, 
2013). Therefore, managers are interested in understanding factors that can 
diminish negative effects and improve the contribution of suppliers to their 
sustainability efforts.   
We define supplier sustainability performance as the extent that the supplier 
operates in an environmentally and socially sustainable manner and complies with 
the buying firm’s environmental and social sustainability requirements (Sancha et 
al., 2016; Thomas et al., 2016). A potential factor affecting supplier sustainability 
performance is buyer-supplier dependence (Hoejmose et al., 2012). Buyer-supplier 
dependence is often suggested as the basis for determining the type of relationship 
to adopt with suppliers to maximize performance (Bensaou, 1999; Kraljic, 1983; 
Terpend and Krause, 2015). Krause et al. (2009) argue that a firm is no more 
sustainable than its supply chain, and further stress that buying firms need to exploit 
their full bargaining power in order to increase supplier compliance to sustainable 
practices. On the other hand, some studies argue that too much pressure in an 
imbalanced dependence situation increases supplier passivity, reduces cooperative 
behavior, and increases resistance to sustainability efforts (Meqdadi et al., 2017; 
Touboulic et al., 2015). Although buyer-supplier dependence is one of the 
foundational topics in purchasing and supply management (PSM) (Van Weele, 
2010; Caniëls and Gelderman, 2007), interestingly, there has been little empirical 
research in the sustainable supply chain management (SSCM) context focusing on 
buyer-supplier dependence (Hoejmose et al., 2013; Sarkis et al., 2011).  
Another factor that can impact supplier sustainability performance is the 
relational capital possessed by the parties. Relational capital can be defined as a 
valuable asset that stems from access to resources made available through social 
relationships (Granovetter, 1992). Kale et al. (2000) identify five dimensions of 
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relational capital: close interpersonal interactions, trust, friendship, respect and 
reciprocity. Trust, which has been found to be highly associated with higher 
supplier performance, is considered as one of the essential elements of relational 
capital (Nahapiet and Ghoshal, 1998; Lee, 2015; Villena and Craighead, 2017). 
Relational capital, especially the trust dimension, has been found to explain several 
PSM practices such as buyer-supplier relationship management approaches (Squire 
et al., 2009). Regarding the performance outcomes, although in general relational 
capital is associated with a positive effect, such as on innovation (e.g. Carey et al., 
2011), some negative effects have also been discussed in relation to both very low 
and very high values (Villena et al., 2017). There have been few studies that have 
also examined relational capital in the sustainable supply management literature 
(e.g. Gimenez and Tachizawa, 2012; Gualandris and Kalschmidt, 2016), where 
relational capital was found to be a distinguishing factor as well.   
The literature suggests that dependence and relational capital are highly 
related to each other, for instance to explain supply chain integration (Zhang et al., 
2013). Ireland and Webb (2007) state that dependence (power) and relational capital 
(trust) can be complementary (for instance, when trust is low, power might have to 
be used as an alternative mechanism) and conflicting (for instance, when power is 
excessively used, it can damage trust). Joshi and Arnold (1977) also illustrate that 
dependence does not cause opportunism when relational capital is high. 
Interestingly, although there have been some studies focusing on buyer-supplier 
dependence and relational capital separately in the SSCM context, these concepts 
have seldom been examined in relation to each other (Hoejmose et al., 2013; 
Meqdadi et al., 2017). As a response to this gap in the literature, in this study we 
aim to answer the following research question: How do buyer-supplier dependence 
and relational capital impact supplier sustainability performance? 
Obviously, there can be several buyer-supplier relationship characteristics 
that affect the supplier sustainability performance; however, our aim in this study 
is not to arrive at an exhaustive list, but by adopting an exploratory approach, rather 
to focus on discovering the complex interplay between dependence and relational 
capital in the sustainability context. In the next sections, we first provide the 
theoretical background, briefly discussing the role of suppliers in general in 
sustainability performance, and then examining in detail the key studies 
investigating the link between buyer-supplier dependence, relational capital and 
sustainability. Then, we present our research method and elaborate on case study 
descriptives. In the Results section, we discuss our findings based on four types of 
buyer-supplier dependence situations and formulate propositions. We conclude our 
paper by discussing theoretical and managerial implications as well as making 
suggestions for future research. 
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2. Literature review 
2.1. Role of suppliers in sustainability performance 
Increasingly, more proactive firms are implementing sustainability practices 
that go beyond mere compliance to environmental and social rules and regulations 
(Blome et al., 2014; Liu et al., 2015). However, these proactive approaches require 
firms to extend their corporate boundaries to the supply chain and collaborate with 
supply chain partners to improve their sustainability performance (Gimenez and 
Tachizawa, 2012; Vachon and Klassen, 2008; Wong et al., 2015). The role of 
suppliers in buyer sustainability strategies and practices has attracted considerable 
attention in the literature. Some studies focus on sustainable supplier selection 
criteria (Govindan et al., 2015; Humphreys et al., 2013) and other discuss green 
supplier development (Bai and Sarkis, 2010; Blome et al., 2014). Recent studies 
discuss the need for managing not only direct suppliers for sustainability, but also 
developing strategies for sub-supplier management (Grimm et al., 2014; Wilhelm 
et al., 2016). 
Studies report mixed findings regarding the contribution of suppliers’ 
sustainable practices to buying firm performance. Based on the results of a meta-
analysis, Golicic et al. (2013) report that in general supplier environmentally 
sustainable practices have a positive impact on market-based, operational-based 
and accounting-based forms of buying firm performance. Hollos et al. (2012) also 
find that supplier’s green practices have a positive impact on buying firm economic 
performance, but they fail to find any significant effect of social practices. The 
different types of sustainable supplier management practices implemented by the 
firms could partly explain this. For instance, previous studies distinguish between 
monitoring versus collaborative sustainable supplier management approaches 
Gimenez et al., 2012; Krause et al., 2009; Vachon and Klassen, 2006). Another 
contingency factor on the supplier sustainability performance is buyer-supplier 
relationship characteristics (Hajmohammad and Vachon, 2016; Hoejmose et al., 
2013; Pagell et al., 2010). In the next section, we discuss two key characteristics: 
buyer-supplier dependence and relational capital.  
2.2. Buyer-supplier dependence and sustainability  
Resource dependence theory (RDT) suggests that organizations are not self-
sufficient and they depend on each other for critical resources (Dyer and Singh, 
1998; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). RDT identifies three main factors of 
dependence: importance of the resource, extent of control over resources, and 
availability of alternatives. Applying this definition to the supply chain context, 
Awaysheh and Klassen (2010) state that dependence is high when a firm relies to a 
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high extent to a supply chain party for critical resources, components, or 
capabilities. Therefore, buyer dependence increases when there are few, critical 
suppliers with limited substitutes, and the supply has high financial and strategic 
importance. (Caniëls and Gelderman, 2007; Knoppen and Christiaanse, 2007; 
Kraljic, 1983; Olsen and Ellram, 1997). From the supplier’s perspective, 
dependence to buying firm increases when the sale revenue from that particular 
buyer and/or switching costs are high, or that the supplier is dependent on the 
buyer’s technological expertise (Caniëls and Gelderman, 2007; Knoppen and 
Christiaanse, 2007). 
While some argue that buyer-supplier relationships are seldom at a balance 
(Petersen et al., 2008), others argue that interdependence (high buyer and supplier 
dependence) and independence (low buyer and supplier dependence) situations can 
also be observed (Hajmohammod and Vachon, 2016; Touboulic et al., 2014). 
Although the common expectation in purchasing and supply management (PSM) is 
that buying firms should minimize dependence on suppliers to instigate competitive 
behavior, buying firms also voluntarily engage in high dependence situations to 
access crucial knowledge and capabilities of their suppliers (Gadde and Wynstra, 
2018; Kahkönen et al., 2015).  
Buyer-supplier dependence is a key concept in PSM that was found to impact 
several PSM practices such as purchase category strategy formulation (Caniëls and 
Gelderman, 2007), value-creating relationship management approaches (Kahkönen 
et al., 2015; Kim and Choi, 2018), and supplier innovation generation (Carr et al., 
2008; Jean et al., 2012). Interestingly, albeit the growing interest in sustainable 
supply chain management, buyer-supplier dependence has been examined to a 
much lesser extent (Hoejmose et al., 2013; Sarkis et al., 2011). For instance, we 
know little about whether buyer-supplier dependence1 asymmetries and joint 
dependence have a positive or negative impact on suppliers’ sustainability efforts 
and buying firm’s performance outcomes. Table 1 summarizes the key arguments 





                                                 
1  Dependence and power are often discussed as highly inter-related concepts; if a focal firm is dependent 
on another firm, then the other firm will hold the relative balance of power (Caniëls and Gelderman, 
2005; Wolf, 2011). Similar to Hajmohammad et al. (2016), we argue that dependency is the basis for 
organizational power; therefore, we focus on the former rather than the latter. 
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Table 1 
Summary of Key Arguments about the Link Between Dependence and Supplier 
Sustainability 





POSITIVE Compliance with 
ecological and 
social requirements 




power to force 
Brockhaus et al. 




Hoejmose et al. 
(2013) 
  Compliance with 
code of conduct  
More incentive as 
future of business 
depends on cooperation 
with buying firm 
Pedersen and 
Andersen (2006) 
  Socially responsible 
practices 
Leverage reputational 
benefits, attract new 
customers 
Dou et al. (2018) 





multiplier effect over 
sub-suppliers 
Hoejmose et al., 
(2013); Meinlschmidt 
et al. (2018) 
 NEGATIVE Socially responsible 
practices 
High price pressure, 
reluctant to invest time 
and resources 
Dabhilkar et al. 
(2016); Hoejmose et 
al. (2013) 




associated with cost 
efficiency, bringing 
cost reduction demand 
from buying firm 
Brockhaus et al. 
(2013) 
    Socially responsible 
practices 






Meqdadi et al. (2017); 
Touboulic et al. 
(2015) 
  





Sanctions in case of 
non-compliance will 
have little effect 
Meqdadi et al. (2017); 
Pedersen and 
Andersen, (2006) 
  Sustainability risk 
related to lower-tier 
suppliers 
Small share of indirect 
turnover, no bargaining 
power 
Meinlschmidt et al. 
(2018) 
   Second-tier supplier 
sustainability 
practices 
Due to large sub-
suppliers, direct 
suppliers  do not 
intervene or share 
information with 
buying firm in order to 
not lose the customer 
Wilhelm et al. (2016) 
  NO EFFECT Social sustainable 
practices 







The majority of the studies argue that a high level of supplier dependence is 
positively associated with supplier compliance to environmental and social 
requirements, increasing buying firm sustainability performance (Brockhaus et al., 
2013; Dou et al., 2018; Hajmohammad and Vachon, 2016; Pedersen and Andersen, 
2006). Proponents of this view usually argue that buying firms can “use their 
bargaining power and enforce/control their suppliers” much better. In case of 
supplier dependence, suppliers also sense that their future business with the buying 
firm depends on effective collaboration and compliance about sustainability 
(Pedersen and Anderson, 2006). Dou et al. (2018) argue that supplier dependence 
does not necessarily mean forcing the supplier to a less desirable collaboration 
about sustainability, but the suppliers might also be motivated due to leveraging 
reputational benefits and attracting new customers. Hoejmose et al. (2013) and 
Meinlschmidt et al. (2018) state that the positive impact of buyer dependence will 
be more pronounced for the lower-tier suppliers. 
On the other hand, some argue that supplier dependence can also have 
detrimental impact on sustainability efforts. Usually, when there is high supplier 
dependence, buying firms also want to leverage that situation by asking for more 
cost reductions from the suppliers which might contradict with the additional 
investments that are necessary for improving supplier sustainability performance 
(Dabhilkar et al., 2016; Hoejmose et al., 2013). Brockhaus et al. (2013) state that 
buying firms sometimes promote sustainability efforts as an efficiency mechanism 
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for suppliers (e.g. reduction of waste), thus the suppliers expect that buying firms 
would be demanding lower prices due to supplier efficiency gains and be hesitant 
to invest in sustainable practices. Similar to the arguments about the dark side of 
relying too much on buyer power in general (Villena et al., 2017), Meqdadi et al. 
(2017) and Touboulic et al. (2014) warn that extreme use of power might backfire 
and reduce cooperative behavior and create resistance among suppliers. 
The literature does not identify any positive impact of buyer dependence to 
suppliers on supplier sustainable practices. The common premise is that there is a 
negative impact due to limited bargaining power and control, and can be reflected 
as buyer sanctions having no impact in case of non-compliance (Meqdadi et al., 
2017; Pedersen and Andersen, 2006). Meinlschmidt et al. (2018) and Wilhelm et 
al. (2016) argue that this effect will be pronounced more at the lower-tier suppliers, 
and no interventions will take place. This can be either due to small turnover of the 
buying firm or the direct supplier not sharing information about the powerful second 
tier supplier with the buying firm with the fear of using the powerful customer 
(Meinlschmidt et al., 2018; Wilhelm et al., 2016). Awaysheh and Klassen (2010), 
on the other hand, propose that this effect might be less visible for social 
sustainability practices compared to environmental sustainability practices, due to 
costs of implementing social practices outweighing the dependence impact. 
In sum, currently there is limited and somewhat contrasting evidence 
regarding the impact of buyer-supplier dependence on supplier sustainability 
practices and buying firm performance outcomes. A possible explanation for the 
contrasting findings might relate to other factors at play with dependence, such as 
relational capital, which we discuss in detail in the next section.  
2.3. Relational capital and sustainability  
Based on social capital theory we distinguish between three types of social 
capital: cognitive, structural, and relational. Relational capital can be defined as a 
valuable asset that stems from access to resources made available through social 
relationships (Granovetter, 1992; Nahapiet and Ghoshal, 1998). Kale et al. (2000) 
identify five dimensions of relational capital: close interpersonal interactions, trust, 
friendship, respect and reciprocity. Trust, which has been found to be highly 
associated with higher supplier performance, is considered as one of the essential 
elements of relational capital (Nahapiet and Ghoshal, 1998; Lee, 2015; Villena and 
Craighead, 2017).  
Similar to buyer-supplier dependence, relational capital (and more 
specifically, its trust dimension) has been extensively examined in the PSM 
literature, as a factor affecting information sharing, relationship commitment, and 
supplier innovation (Geyskens et al., 1996; Henke and Zhang, 2010; Li and Lin, 
2006). Relational capital is argued to be an enabler in buyer-supplier relationships 
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as it reduces opportunistic behavior, increases communication and aids developing 
long-term relationships while reducing transaction costs (Dyer and Singh, 1998; 
Lee, 2015; Villena and Craighead, 2017). However, there have also been studies 
that have warned against the dark side of trust-based buyer-supplier relationships 
that can be caused by the focus on immediate returns, strong interpersonal 
relationships, and unique process adaptations and investments (Andersen and Jap, 
2005; Villena et al., 2016). 
Relational capital is highly relevant in the SSCM context as well. Table 2 
illustrates the key arguments in the literature regarding the link between relational 
capital and supplier sustainability. Almost all studies suggest a positive impact 
(Gimenez and Tachizawa, 2012; Gualandris and Kalschmidt, 2016; Lee, 2015). 
Some argue that it is a necessary condition for supplier compliance to code-of-
conduct and environmental information sharing as it deters opportunistic behavior 
and the buying firms are more confident regarding the reliability and willingness of 
suppliers to adhere to environmental practices (Chen and Hung, 2014; Geffen and 
Rothenburg, 2000; Hoejmose et al., 2012; Pedersen and Andersen, 2006). Lee 
(2015) argues that this effect is even stronger for SME suppliers. Some studies 
further add that although it is a necessary condition, it is not sufficient by itself 
(Hoejmose et al., 2012; Pedersen and Andersen, 2006); for instance, it is only 
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Table 2 
Summary of Key Arguments about the Link Between Relational Capital and 
Supplier Sustainability 
Impact Sustainable practice Motivation Author(s) 
POSITIVE Supplier compliance 
to code-of-conduct 
Necessary, but not 






facilitator due to deterring 
opportunistic behavior 
Chen and Hung 
(2014); Geffen and 
Rothenburg (2000) 
 Green supply behavior Reliability and willingness 
of suppliers to adhere to 
environmental practices, 
credibility is not an easily 
imitable resource 
Hoejmose et al. 
(2012) 
 Green supply behavior Trust has to be combined 
with top management 
support, and there is need 
for "mutual" trust 
Hoejmose et al. 
(2012) 
  SSCM practices, 
innovative solutions 
Enabler due to increased 
supplier commitment and 
incentives - especially 







NEGATIVE Buyer sustainable 
supplier management 
practices 
Reduce the need for 
monitoring 
Vachon and Klassen 
(2006) 
 
Although the PSM literature highlights that trust can also be detrimental in 
some cases, in the SSCM literature there is limited evidence regarding this effect. 
Briefly, Meqdadi et al. (2017) mention that high levels of trust can cause the buying 
firms to instigate less sustainable supply management practices due to over-
confidence in the supplier and feel a reduced need for monitoring supplier 
sustainability practices and performance. There is a need for more research to 
investigate the impact of trust on supplier sustainability, especially considering the 
arguments that it is not a sufficient factor itself and that it is related to other buyer-
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supplier relationship characteristics. A possible interaction, the link between 
relational capital and dependence, is discussed in the next section.  
2.4. Dependence and relational capital: Conflicting or complementary? 
Schnittfeld and Busch (2016) argue that there is an inherent trade-off between 
power and trust; when buyer-supplier relationships are mostly based on power 
plays, then trust will be damaged. Petersen et al. (2008) find that when the supplier 
has more power, the buying firm will actively try to strengthen relational capital, 
by means of socialization processes ensuring cooperative norms. Confirming this 
view, McCarthy-Byrne and Mentzer (2011) argue that when buyer-supplier 
relationships are asymmetrically dependent, the less powerful party initiates 
“bonding behavior”. For suppliers, this could mean investing in specific technology 
just for the buying firm or sharing information to increase supply visibility, in order 
to secure the relationship and demand future business. Ireland and Webb (2007) 
state that power (dependence) and trust (relational capital) can be complementary 
(for instance, when trust is low, power might have to be used as an alternative 
mechanism), and conflicting, (for instance, when power is excessively used, it can 
damage trust). The interplay between dependence and relational capital is also 
stressed by Joshi and Arnold (1997), who find that dependence results in 
opportunism in case of low relational capital.  
There is little information regarding how the interplay between dependence 
and relational capital impact supplier sustainability performance. Some argue that 
the type of power is important: while coercive power damaging trust might be 
necessary to increase supplier sustainability compliance, non-coercive power can 
be implemented effectively with trust to support more collaborative sustainability 
practices (Hoejmose et al., 2013; Meqdadi et al., 2017). Clearly, there is a need for 
more research to understand the collaborative effect of buyer-supplier dependence 
and relational capital on supplier sustainability performance. 
3. Research method 
3.1. Case selection criteria 
Considering the rather preliminary state of research regarding the link 
between buyer-supplier dependence, relational capital, and supplier sustainability 
performance, we opted for a theory-building rather than theory-testing approach 
(Barratt et al., 2011; Eisenhardt, 1989; Yin, 2009). We conducted a multiple-case 
study by examining 14 buyer-supplier relationships in five large companies 
operating in Turkey. Multiple cases aid theory development by facilitating 
identification of patterns and enabling the observation of extreme examples of 
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important patterns and situations (Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007). Recent studies 
also suggest the need for conducting more qualitative research about SSCM (Taylor 
and Vachon, 2018).  
Our unit of analysis is the buyer-supplier dyad. We chose the buying firms 
from different industries in order to increase external validity and generalization 
(Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007). Cases were chosen based on detailed discussions 
with the main contact person in buying firms, aiming for variety across suppliers in 
terms of buyer-supplier dependence. Table 3 illustrates the descriptives regarding 
the cases.  
Table 3 
Case Descriptives and Interview Details 
   Number of...  Data 
collection 
period 
Buyer company FTEs Main products/services S*: R: I: Q: 





4 5 3 5 Jan'17-May'18 
B2 - HOUSEHOLD 15300 TV, mobile, white 




3 5 3 4 Jan'17-May'18 
B3 - STEEL PIPE 1500 Industrial (gas, water, 
general purpose) pipes 
and profiles 
manufacturing 
2 3 1 3 Mar'18-May'18 
B4 - TIRE 2200 Tire manufacturing 4 4 3 5 Jan'18-May'18 
B5 - AUTOMOTIVE 5500 Passenger and 
commercial vehicles 
1 1 2 2 Jan'17-May'17 
Total      14 18 12 19   
*S: Suppliers, R: Respondents, I: Interviews, Q: Questionnaires 
 
3.2. Data collection, validity, and reliability 
We collected data from both buying firms and supplier firms, between January 
2017 and May 2018 (Table 3), in order to account for the differences in perspectives 
regarding the relationship characteristics. Data from buying firms were collected 
from purchasing managers and buyers via both questionnaires and detailed 
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interviews. Initially, informants were asked to fill out a short questionnaire in 
English regarding the key concepts in this study. Afterwards, detailed interviews of 
60-90 minutes were held to understand “why” and “how” questions and ask for 
specific examples to complement their answers to the questionnaire. In total 12 
interviews were held with the buying firms. Data from supplier firms were collected 
via questionnaires, and the buying firm respondents elaborated on their answers as 
we did not have direct access to the suppliers due to confidentiality. To minimize 
potential respondent bias, we paid special attention to the wording of the questions 
and avoided personal questions (Cui et al., 2012). We took various measures to 
improve the validity and reliability, which are indicated on Table 4 together with 
the definitions for validity and reliability types.  
Table 4 
Validity and Reliability Measures Undertaken in This Study 
Validity & reliability types Measures 
Construct validity: “the extent to which 
correct operational measures are 
established for the concepts being 
studied” 
 Data triangulation: Semi-structured 
interviews and preliminary 
questionnaire 
 Pre-testing interview questions with 
company contacts 
 Presenting the initial findings and 
getting feedback from company 
contacts 
 
Internal validity: “the extent to which 
causal relationships can be established 
whereby certain conditions are shown to 
lead to other conditions, as distinguished 
from spurious relationships” 
 
 Use of a conceptual framework 
External validity: “the extent to which 
the findings of a study can be 
generalized to a bigger population” 
 
 
 Use of multiple case studies 
 Investigating different industries 
 Collecting data from both buying 
firms and supplier firms 
 
Reliability: “the extent to which the 
operations of a study can be repeated 
with the same results" 
 Developing a detailed case study 
protocol 
 Transcribing the interview data 
 Developing a case study database 
 
110 Melek Akın Ateş - Atakan Güleryüz - İrem Güleryüz - Ataberk Arslan 
3.3. Measurement 
Appendix A provides the interview questions and Appendix B provides the 
questionnaire items. We aimed to assess four key concepts: buyer/supplier 
dependence, relational capital, transaction-specific investments, and supplier 
sustainability performance. Questionnaire items were borrowed from previous 
literature (i.e. Caniëls and Gelderman, 2005; Eckerd and Hill, 2012; Luzzini et al., 
2015; Villenda and Craighead, 2017; Wagner and Bode, 2014) and interview 
questions were formulated as semi-structured, enabling emerging issues to be 
investigated.  
When evaluating supplier sustainability performance, we asked our 
interviewees to consider in general whether the supplier operates in an 
environmentally and socially sustainable manner and has an excellent 
environmental/social track record (Thomas et al., 2016). We further gave them 
some examples such as the supplier’s environmental policy and certifications, use 
of recycled material, efficient energy and resource use, good health and safety 
conditions at work, paying attention to employer rights, etc. to evaluate such 
behavior (Amindoust et al., 2012; Bai and Sarkis, 2014; Seuring and Miller, 2008). 
Since our main data collection tool is interviews with purchasing managers, we also 
focused on the manager’s perception of the supplier’s “compliance” to 
environmental and social requirements (Sancha et al., 2016).  If the interviewee 
indicated excellence in all areas, we considered this as “high” performance. In case 
of “going beyond expectations”, we classified this as “very high” performance. In 
some cases, interviewees reflected an average level of dissatisfaction, or indicated 
some problematic areas such as “the need for having environmental certificates” or 
“issues with safety conditions”. We classified these as “moderate” performance. 
There was one case where the interviewee illustrated several issues in the supplier 
audit and negligence of the supplier towards buyer’s sustainability requirements. 
We labeled this case as “low” supplier performance. 
4. Results 
As our purpose in this research is to find “patterns across cases” rather than 
examining the links among the individual variables in each case, we do not have 
detailed within-case analysis, but we proceed with cross-case analysis (e.g. Ateş et 
al., 2015; Kauremaa et al., 2009; Ellram and Tate, 2015).  
First, we prepared detailed within-case descriptions to generate insights and 
assess the underlying mechanisms behind the observations (Barratt et al., 2011). 
Then, we categorized each case based on buyer-supplier dependence. Similar to 
Hajmohammod and Vachon (2016) and Touboulic et al. (2014), we identify four 
types of buyer-supplier dependence situations as illustrated in Figure 1: 1.Supplier 
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dominance (high buyer dependence, low supplier dependence), 2. Independence 
(low buyer and supplier dependence), 3. Interdependence (high buyer and supplier 
dependence), and 4. Buyer dominance (high supplier dependence, low buyer 
dependence).  
Figure 1 




Based on our analyses, we found that although initially not conceptualized in 
the literature review, the supplier’s transaction-specific investments in the buying 
firm, also had an important role in understanding the relationship between buyer-
supplier dependence, relational capital, and supplier sustainability performance. 
Transaction-specific investments are tangible and intangible assets that have very 
little value outside a particular relationship (Williamson, 1985), such as dedicated 
design and engineering assets, personnel, inventory, and capital equipment and 
tools (Lohtia and Krapfel, 1994; Wagner and Bode, 2014). Below, we elaborate on 
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4.1. Supplier dominance 
Table 5 












CASE 1 HIGH VERY HIGH LOW HIGH VERY HIGH 
CASE 2 MODERATE MODERATE MODERATE HIGH MODERATE 
 
Two of our dyads (Case 1: B2 (HOUSEHOLD)_S1, Case 2: B1 
(DEFENSE)_S4) illustrate the supplier dominance situation. In both cases, the 
buying firm is not one of the largest customers of the suppliers. We found that in 
Case 1, supplier sustainability performance was very high as evidenced by an 
excellent track record of implementing sustainable practices such as having 
recycling and waste reduction programs. Furthermore, both interviewees for Case 
1 reported that the supplier not only confirmed to environmental and social 
requirements of the buying firm, but also took a proactive approach and went 
beyond the requirements. It was noteworthy to see that in this case, both buyer and 
supplier had high levels of relational capital. This relationship was indicated to be 
an exemplary case where there was high levels of trust accompanied by personal 
interactions based on long-term relationship expectations. One of the interviewees 
remarked, “Our relationship with Supplier B2_S1 is of a different kind. We have a 
long-standing tradition of doing business with them and never a single day we 
observed an issue that damages our trust in them. Supplier B2_S1 has other big 
customers, but we feel they see us as a special partner”. On the other hand, in Case 
2, supplier sustainability performance was average. The interviewee stated that 
“Although as the leader in the defense sector we give some recommendations to 
Supplier B1_S4 in terms of sustainability, we have less power since they also supply 
several other defense firms in Turkey. Of course, Supplier B1_S4 has the necessary 
certifications such as ISO9001 and ISO45001, otherwise they cannot be our 
suppliers in the that a high-level first place. But, they are always resistant to our 
additional sustainability criteria. They do have some work condition issues in the 
warehouse. We noted that compared to Case 1, in this case relational capital was 
also moderate; although there was a long-term relationship, the interviewee 
indicated that it was mostly a transactional approach and there was little personal 
relationship.  
The above findings suggest that even if the buying firm is dependent on its 
supplier, still supplier sustainability performance can be high if both parties have 
high levels of relational capital. However, if there is lower relational capital, 
supplier sustainability performance will suffer. Therefore, we propose that: 
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Proposition 1: Relational capital offsets the negative impact of supplier 
dominance on supplier sustainability performance.  
The literature often focuses on the buyer dominance situations when 
examining buyer-supplier relationships; therefore, we have limited information 
regarding supplier dominance (Kahkönen et al., 2015). Dabhilkar et al. (2015) argue 
that when the buyer is dependent on a supplier, it will not be able to pressure its 
supplier for implementing sustainable practices. Similarly, Touboulic et al. (2014) 
argue that when supplier is the more powerful party, there is limited engagement of 
the supplier in sustainability policies that are being pushed by the buying firm. 
Additionally, they add that the buying firm will also not enter into long-term 
relationships with suppliers in those situations and instead focus more on cost-
related objectives. Related to this view, Hajmohammad and Vachon (2016) propose 
that in case of supplier dominance, rather than taking any risk mitigating actions 
(i.e. monitoring-based and collaboration-based), buying firms should accept 
supplier sustainability risk, which they define as “the adverse impact on a buying 
organization from a supplier’s social or environmental misconduct (p.48)”. In other 
words, they propose that the buying firm should be ready to face detrimental effects 
rather than performance increases, since powerful suppliers will be inclined to resist 
to buyer’s environmental and social requirements (Hoejmose et al., 2013). 
However, our findings illustrate that when relational capital is high, supplier 
sustainability performance can still be high even in supplier dominance situations. 
Therefore, to offset the negative effect of supplier dominance on sustainability 
performance, a remedy is to invest in relational capital, aiming to increase 
reciprocity and trust. 
4.2. Independence 
Table 6 
Independence case results 







PERFORMANCE CASE # 
CASE 3 MODERATE HIGH MODERATE VERY HIGH 
CASE 4 MODERATE HIGH LOW VERY HIGH 
CASE 5 MODERATE VERY HIGH VERY HIGH HIGH 
CASE 6 MODERATE MODERATE MODERATE MODERATE 
 
Four of our dyads (Case 3: B4 (TYRE)_S2, Case 4: B4 (TYRE)_S4, Case 5: 
B2 (HOUSEHOLD)_S3, B1 (DEFENSE)_S3) illustrate the independence 
situation. The cases illustrate a variety of transaction-specific investments. It was 
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interesting to note of transaction specific investment in Case 5, despite the 
independence. The interviewee stated that there is transaction-specific investment 
as the supplier recently invested in a new machinery to match the increasing volume 
from the buyer, but that was common for some other customers as well due to the 
project-based nature of supplier’s business. In all cases, buyer relational capital was 
moderate, but supplier relational capital was often high. Although the majority of 
the buying firms stated that there was no trust-related issues, they stated that there 
is hardly any personal interaction with suppliers. On the other hand, supplier 
questionnaires illustrate that in general suppliers seem to think that there is 
reciprocity, mutual trust, and mutual respect, suggesting a gap in terms of perceived 
relational capital. Regarding supplier sustainability performance, the interviewee in 
Case 6 reports that: “B1_S3 does not strike us as a sustainability champion. They 
do have the necessary certificates, but they never show an interest in our supplier 
development (environmental) programs and trainings”, illustrating only a moderate 
level of performance. On the other hand, the interviewee in Cases 3-4 state that: 
“We do not specifically ask for a higher sustainability performance from B4_S2 
and B4_S4, but they clearly outperform their competitors in sustainability. B4_S2 
even has a formal environmental management system”.  
It is interesting to note that when there is relational capital asymmetry 
favoring the buying firm, supplier sustainability performance was high, and when 
supplier relational capital was moderate, sustainability performance was lower as 
well. These results seem to suggest that independence does not result in lower 
sustainability performance per se; when there is positive supplier relational capital 
asymmetry, sustainability performance is still high. 
Therefore, we propose that: 
Proposition 2: Positive supplier relational capital asymmetry offsets the 
negative impact of independence on supplier sustainability performance.  
Dabhilkar et al. (2015) state that there is a trade-off between social and 
environmental sustainability and cost objectives, especially for non-critical 
components where the buying firm has limited interest in the supplier. 
Hajmohammad and Vachon (2016) argue that in independence situations, if supply 
risk is low, buying firms just accept the risk and if supply risk is high, they avoid 
the risk and possibly terminate the relationship with the supplier. Our findings 
suggest that there might not be a need to terminate the relationship if the supplier 
has a higher relational capital than the buying firm, still justifying compliance with 
the buying firm’s sustainability requirements.  
 
  
METU STUDIES IN DEVELOPMENT 115 
4.3. Interdependence 
Table 7 
Interdependence Case Results 







PERFORMANCE CASE # 
CASE 7 VERY HIGH VERY HIGH VERY  HIGH VERY HIGH 
CASE 8 MODERATE MODERATE HIGH HIGH 
CASE 9 MODERATE MODERATE VERY HIGH HIGH 
CASE 10 VERY HIGH VERY HIGH MODERATE MODERATE 
 
 
Four of our dyads (Case 7: B2 (HOUSEOLD)_S2, Case 8: B1 
(DEFENSE)_S1, Case 9: B5 (AUTOMOTIVE)_S1, Case 10: B3 (STEEL 
PIPE)_S1) illustrate the characteristics of interdependence. For both parties, it is 
difficult to find a new buyer/supplier and the majority of their purchasing 
spend/sales depend on the other party. It is interesting to see that in these cases there 
is no relational capital asymmetry; both parties share the same level of relational 
capital. However, relational capital does not seem to have a big impact on supplier 
sustainability performance; we see both moderate and high supplier sustainability 
performance in high relational capital situations. In Case 10, the interviewee states 
that: “Once the former manager of our strategic supplier started in B3_S1, we 
shifted more volume to B3_S1 to support him, as we have a long history of doing 
business together. The personal relationships are very important here”. However, 
it seems that high level of relational capital is not a differentiator of supplier 
sustainability performance in interdependence situations, as both buyer and supplier 
are already committed in the relationship. On the other hand, buyer-specific 
supplier investments (e.g. dedicated personnel, inventory, capital equipment) 
becomes more important. When there is high level of transaction-specific 
investments, supplier sustainability performance becomes higher.  
Therefore, we propose that: 
Proposition 3: In case of interdependence, supplier sustainability 
performance will be higher when there are transaction-specific investments.  
Hajmohammad and Vachon (2015) argue that in case of interdependence, 
buying firms engage in more collaborative activities, regardless of the perceived 
sustainability risk. These collaborative approaches require going beyond traditional 
compliance to sustainability objectives, and engaging in more proactive practices, 
for instance in the form of environmental investments (Klassen and Vachon, 2003; 
Touboulic and Walker, 2015). 
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4.4. Buyer dominance 
Four of our dyads (Case 11: B4 (TYRE)_S3, B4 (TYRE)_S1, B3 
(AUTOMOTIVE)_ S2, and B1 (DEFENSE)_S2 illustrate characteristics of 
supplier dependence. Surprisingly, we find that high supplier dependence does not 
result in high supplier sustainability performance per se; in contrast, often 
performance is low or moderate. Even if the relational capital is high, at best it is 
associated with moderate levels of supplier sustainability performance and when 
relational capital is low, it is associated with the lowest performance.  High supplier 
sustainability performance is achieved when there are higher levels of transaction-
specific investments only, but even these investments do not suffice if both buyer 
and supplier have low relational capital.  These results seem to support the view 
that buyer dominance is more harmful than beneficial for sustainability 
performance, which seems somewhat counter-intuitive in the first place.  
We argue that one explanation could be the focus of buying firms on cost 
gains benefiting from the dependency situation. The majority of the interviewees in 
Cases 11-14 reported that in supplier dependency situations they have more power 
over their suppliers and can easily demand more sustainable practices. For instance, 
the interviewee in Cases 11-12 state that “We are using our buying power on these 
suppliers to make them work in accordance with our sustainability criteria and we 
can easily implement disciplinary sanctions”. However, once we asked them to 
evaluate the sustainability performance of these suppliers, they seemed not 
satisfied, contrary to their own view about power and supplier sustainability 
compliance. Supplier dependence is often seen in leverage categories (Kraljic, 
1983). We argue that in case of supplier dependence, although the supplier might 
seem willing to comply with whatever requirement the buying firm has (including 
sustainability-related), at the end of the day they first want to be more competitive 
in terms of cost since the buyer is quite flexible in switching suppliers. Indeed the 
interviewee in B3 (STEEL PIPE) state that “When we do not have a single source 
situation and suppliers fight for getting more share from us, of course we are 
advantageous. We would try to shift as much business as possible to the supplier 
with high sustainability performance, but we can never convince top management 
if there is a much cheaper supplier.” In such cases, when suppliers are dependent, 
they pay more attention to securing their relationship via offering cheaper prices 
than competitors do, rather than investing in sustainability efforts (Dabhilkar et al., 
2016; Hoejmose et al., 2013). 
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Table 8 
Buyer dominance case results 







PERFORMANCE CASE # 
CASE 11 MODERATE HIGH MODERATE VERY HIGH 
CASE 12 HIGH VERY HIGH MODERATE/LOW MODERATE 
CASE 13 VERY HIGH VERY HIGH MODERATE/LOW MODERATE 
CASE 14 LOW MODERATE HIGH LOW 
 
Therefore, we propose that: 
Proposition 4: The negative effect of buyer dominance on supplier 
sustainability performance is attenuated by transaction-specific investments on the 
supplier side; however, if buyer relational capital is low, even high transaction-
specific investments on the supplier side will not suffice.” 
Several studies suggest that supplier dependence is a necessary condition for 
supplier’s compliance to the buyer’s environmental and social sustainability 
requirements (Hajmohammad and Vachon, 2016). However, there are also views 
that suggest that too much buyer power creates supplier resistance and negatively 
impacts the achievement of long-term sustainability goals (Meqdadi et al., 2017; 
Touboulic et al., 2014). Our findings seem to support the latter view. Furthermore, 
as Case 14 illustrates, if the negative effect of dependence/ buyer power is coupled 
with low relational capital of both parties, even high transaction-specific 
investments made by the supplier do not suffice. 
5. Conclusion 
This study makes three major contributions to the literature. First, we illustrate 
the complex interplay between buyer-supplier dependence and relational capital in 
affecting supplier sustainability performance.  Although there have been some 
studies in SSCM investigating buyer-supplier dependence and relational capital 
separately, these two concepts have seldom been examined in relation to each other 
(Hoejmose et al., 2013; Meqdadi et al., 2017). Our findings suggest that in case of 
supplier dominance, sustainability performance is likely to suffer; however, when 
there is high relational capital these negative effects are suppressed. Similarly, in 
case of independence (when both parties have little importance for each other), it is 
the positive supplier relational capital asymmetry (more relational capital possessed 
by the supplier compared to buying firm) that offsets the negative impact on 
supplier sustainability performance. The literature often suggests that when buying 
firms have less bargaining power (e.g. in case of supplier dominance or 
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independence), suppliers have less incentives to invest in sustainable practices 
(Touboulic et al., 2015). However, our findings illustrate that this negative affect 
can be reduced/suppressed by investing in relational capital; trust, personal 
interactions and reciprocity.  
Second, adopting an exploratory approach and conducting multiple case 
studies, we were able to examine another contingency factor emerging from our 
data: transaction-specific investments. Our findings illustrate that, in some 
dependence situations relational capital does not make a difference; instead, 
supplier transaction-specific investments come into play. In line with previous 
studies, we found that when there is interdependence (for both parties the 
relationship is critical), supplier sustainability performance is often very high. 
However, we saw that when the supplier does not invest in transaction-specific 
investments, supplier sustainability performance suffers. These results suggest that 
interdependence does not guarantee high sustainability performance per se, but that 
it has to be coupled with high levels of investments. Similarly, we also illustrate the 
role of transaction-specific investments in case of buyer dominance. In contrast to 
findings suggesting that buyer dominance is advantageous for supplier 
sustainability conformance (e.g. Brockhaus et al., 2013; Dou et al., 2018; 
Hajmohammad and Vachon; 2016), we found that the opposite is true: often it has 
a detrimental effect. Meqdadi et al. (2017) and Touboulic et al. (2015) argue that 
this can be due to the high price pressure from the buying firm that increases 
passivity, reduces cooperative behavior, and increases resistance among suppliers. 
However, we also find that these negative effects in case of buyer dominance can 
be attenuated by transaction-specific investments that makes suppliers more 
committed to buying firm sustainability strategies.  
Third, this study contributes to the literature by developing propositions to be 
tested in future studies, in larger samples. Undoubtedly, the external validity of our 
findings is limited due to the exploratory nature of our study and our propositions 
need to be examined in different industries and countries. Apart from large-N 
survey studies, an alternative approach to compare findings from larger number of 
qualitative cases can be fuzzy qualitative comparative analysis (fQCA) 
(Greckhamer et al., 2018).  
Our study also makes some important managerial contributions. Our findings 
illustrate that purchasing and supply chain managers should not be overconfident 
(for instance, in case of buyer dominance), as we find that it can even be detrimental 
to supplier sustainability performance. Additionally, in order to achieve higher 
supplier sustainability performance, buying firms need to invest in relational 
capital, by having frequent meetings with the suppliers aiming to improve trust 
between the parties. It seems that in case of independence, buying firms do not need 
to invest as much in relational capital, as our findings suggest that a positive 
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relational capital asymmetry (where suppliers have more relational capital) is more 
advantageous. Purchasing managers also need to be aware of the role of transaction-
specific investments and encourage their suppliers to undertake such investments, 
especially in case of buyer dominance and interdependence. It could be costly for 
the suppliers to start these investments in the first place; therefore, buying firms 
might also support supplier investments by not forcing them to the last penny and 
not having solely cost-focused negotiations.  
As with any other study, this study is not without limitations. As the current 
state of knowledge on this topic is rather scarce, we adopted an exploratory 
approach and conducted multiple case studies. Therefore, the generalizability of our 
findings is limited. Future studies should focus on examining possibly other sectors 
and countries, and also by means of theory-testing approaches designing large-N 
studies. Furthermore, although we collected information from both the buying firm 
and supplier firm to capture both firms’ perspectives, we were not able to conduct 
interviews directly with the suppliers due to confidentiality issues. Instead, buying 
firms distributed the questionnaires and later on elaborated on the suppliers’ 
answers, regarding how they perceive the results of the supplier surveys and gave 
some examples to clarify their answers. Future studies can extend this approach and 
conduct interviews directly with the suppliers. Finally, regarding buyer-supplier 
relationship characteristics, we focus on buyer-supplier dependence, relational 
capital, and transaction-specific investments. Future studies can investigate other 
characteristics such as supply base structure (Choi and Krause, 2006), also 
extending the dyadic level of analysis to network level. We nonetheless hope that 
we have made a first attempt in investigating the complex interplay between buyer-
supplier characteristics and supplier sustainability performance and generated some 
interesting findings and propositions to be investigated further in future studies. 
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APPENDIX A. INTERVIEW QUESTIONS: 
GENERIC QUESTIONS: 
 In general, how would you (Supplier X) describe your relationship with 
Supplier X (your firm)? 
 What are the general supply market characteristics that Supplier X is part 
of? 
 How long have your firm and Supplier X been working together?  
BUYER DEPENDENCE: 
 To what extent is your firm (Supplier X) dependent on Supplier X (your 
firm)? 
 What kind of advantages/disadvantages are associated with 
dependence/independence to Supplier X (your firm)? 
RELATIONAL CAPITAL: 
 To what extent would you (Supplier X) describe your (its) relationship 
with Supplier X (your firm) as based on close personal interaction, mutual 
respect/trust, friendship, reciprocity? Could you give some examples? Did 
you also have any bad experiences? 
SUSTAINABILITY PERFORMANCE: 
 How would you rate the performance of Supplier X with regards to 
environmental and social compliance? Could you please give some 
examples?  
 In your opinion, why some suppliers score higher/lower on sustainability 
performance? 
 
APPENDIX B. QUESTIONNAIRE ITEMS: 
Buyer dependence (Caniëls and Gelderman, 2005): Please indicate to what 
extent you agree/disagree with the following statements about Supplier X (1: 
completely disagree; 5: completely agree): 
 The products/services we sell to this customer constitute an important 
portion of our total sales. 
 If we changed this supplier, it would be difficult for us to find a new 
supplier to substitute their place. 
 We are dependent on this supplier's technological expertise. 
 We are highly dependent on this supplier. 
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Supplier dependence (Caniëls and Gelderman, 2005): Please indicate to what 
extent you agree/disagree with the following statements about Customer X (1: 
completely disagree; 5: completely agree): 
 The products/services we sell to this customer constitute a significant part 
of our total sales. 
 If we did not work with this customer, it would be difficult for us to find a 
new customer to substitute them. 
 We are dependent on this customer's technological expertise. 
 We are highly dependent on this customer. 
Relational capital (Villena and Craighead, 2017): Please indicate the extent to 
which the relationship is characterized by... (1: to a very low extent; 5: to a very 
high extent) 
 A close personal interaction 
 Mutual respect 
 Mutual trust 
 Friendship 
 Reciprocity 
Supplier satisfaction (Eckerd and Hill, 2012): Please indicate to what extent you 
agree/disagree with the following statements about Customer X (1: completely 
disagree; 5: completely agree): 
 Our companies have an effective working relationship. 
 The buying firm carried out its responsibilities and commitments to our 
company. 
 The time and effort spent developing and maintaining our relationship with 
this buying firm is worthwhile. 
 We are satisfied with our relationship with this buying firm. 
 Our relationship with this buying firm is productive. 
Supplier relation-specific investments (Wagner and Bode, 2014): Please indicate 
to what extent you agree/disagree with the following statements about Customer X 
(1: completely disagree; 5: completely agree): 
 We changed our product features for this customer. 
 We changed our personnel for this customer. 
 We changed our inventory and logistics for this customer. 
 We changed our capital equipment and tools for this customer. 
 We made significant investments in specific knowledge dedicated to this 
customer. 
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Supplier sustainability performance (Luzzini et al., 2015): What is the level of 
supplier X's performance – compared to other suppliers – for the following 
objectives (1: much lower; 5: much higher): 
 Environmental compliance from this supplier. 
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Özet 
Tedarikçi sürdürülebilirlik performansını anlamak: Bağımlılık ve ilişkisel 
sermayenin rolü 
 
Sürdürülebilirlik performansını arttırmaya yönelik artan paydaş baskısı ile firmalar, alıcı-tedarikçi 
ilişkisi özelliklerinin tedarikçilerin sürdürülebilirlik çabalarını teşvik etmede veya tehlikeye atmada nasıl 
bir rol oynadığını anlamaya odaklanmaktadır. Bu çalışmada, alıcı-tedarikçi bağımlılığı ve ilişkisel 
sermayenin tedarikçilerin çevresel ve sosyal performansına olan etkisi incelenmektedir. Gömülü, çoklu 
vaka yöntemi ile Türkiye'deki beş büyük alıcı firma ve bu firmaların tedarikçileri ikili ilişki düzeyinde 
analiz edilmiştir. Bulgularımız tedarikçi sürdürülebilirlik performansında hem tamamlayıcı hem de çelişkili 
roller gösteren bağımlılık ve ilişkisel sermaye arasında karmaşık bir etkileşim olduğunu göstermektedir. 
Çalışmanın sonunda, ileriki çalışmalarda test edilmek üzere hipotezler geliştirilmektedir.  
Anahtar kelimeler: Bağımlılık, ilişkisel sermaye, tedarikçi sürdürülebilirlik performansı. 
 
 
 
  
 
